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epileptic seizure. Where evidence supported every element of the crime, corrobor-
ative privileged statements by the defendant's doctor before the grand jury did
not require dismissal of the indictment. The case differed from People v. Decina7
in that privileged testimony was not introduced at the trial.
Right To Counsel
The Code of Criminal Procedure not only provides that a defendant has a
right to counsel, but also that he must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
obtain such counsel.88
In People v. Afarincic,8 the Court held, reversing the City Court of Water-
town and the County Court,90 that a conviction of petit larceny could not be
upheld where the lower court informed the defendant of her rights under section
699 and then, without waiting for any reply, imm~diately asked the defendant
how she pleaded, and accepted a plea of guilty.
Section 699 specifically provides that "a magistrate must allow the defend-
ant a reasonable time to send for counsel, and adjourn the proceedings for that
purpose.""' This section is not satisfied if the defendant is merely informed of
his right to counsel? 2 He must be afforded a real opportunity to obtain such
counsel?3
The Law Revision Report of 1940, which resulted in the enactment of sec-
tion 699, makes it clear that the defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity
to request counsel before beiig told to plead.9 4 Since the lower court did not
comply with either the spirit or the language of the statute, the Court of Appeals
properly reversed the conviction.
Right To Speedy Trial
During the last term of the Court of Appeals, two problems concerning the
defendant's waiver of his right to a speedy trial were adjudicated.
In People v. White,9 5 although four years had elapsed from the filing of the
indictment to the time of trial, counsel for the defense not only acquiesced in
87. See note 71 supra.
88. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §699.
89. 2 N.Y. 2d 181, 158 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1957).
90. 152 N.Y.S. 2d 382 (County Ct. 1956).
91. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §699(2).
92. People v. Pahner, 296 N.Y. 324, 73 N.E.2d 533 (1947).
93. People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53 N.E. 2d 356 (1943).
94. REPORT or LAw REVISION COMMISSION 1940, p. 95.
95. 2 N.Y.2d 220, 159 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1957).
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adjournments and delays but also failed to raise the point until the appeal in
the Appellate Division. The Court held that such conduct constituted a waiver. A
defendant cannot participate in a trial and save his objection of undue delay to
challenge an adverse verdict.
In People v. Chirieleison,96 the defendant, after completion of a prison
sentence, was held for trial on a five-year old charge. After denial of his motion to
dismiss the indictment and the dismissal of his appeal by the Appellate Division
upon the ground that the order was intermediate and not appealable, 97 the defend-
ant pleaded guilty to a lesser crime. Holding that the indictment should have been
dismissed when the motion was first made, the Court said that the defendant's
subsequent plea of guilty may not be deemed a waiver.
The weight of precedent gives credence to the decisions reached in the above
instances. In People v. Perry,98 defendant's attorney consented to postponement of
the trial. The court in holding this conduct to be a waiver of the defendant's right
to a speedy trial said, as did the court in Beavers v. Hanbert,9 9 that the right of a
speedy trial is necessarily relative and may be waived; it depends upon the circum-
stances. In People ex rel lanik v. Daly,1 the defendant's acquiescence in postpone-
ment of the trial was held to be a waiver. In People v. Russo,2 the defendant
sought to have the conviction vacated alleging that he had been deprived of his
right to a speedy trial. The court in denying the defendant's motion replied that
the defendant's failure to raise the objection at the time of trial constituted a
waiver.
While it is well settled that an indicted person has a right to a speedy trial,3
he is not affirmatively obliged to seek such a trial.4 If the prosecution delays in
procuring a trial, the defendant may raise the objection that he has not been
granted a speedy trial and move for the dismissal of the indictment.5
Public Trial
In interpreting statutory provisions the spirit and purpose of the statute and
the objectives sought to be accomplished by the legislature must be borne in
96. 3 N.Y.2d 170, 164 N.Y.S2d 726 (1957).
97. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROc. §517; In re Montgomery, 126 App. Div. 72, 110
N.Y. Supp. 793 (1st Dep't 1908), appeal dismissed, 193 N.Y. 659, 87 N.E. 1123
(1908); People v. Reed, 276 N.Y. 5, 11 N.E.2d 330 (1937).
98. 196 Misc. 922, 96 N.Y.S.2d 517 (County Ct. 1949).
99. 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
1. 30 N.Y. Crim. Rep. 47, 142 N.Y. Supp. 297 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
2. 3 Misc. 2d 916, 155 N.Y.S.2d 765 (County Ct. 1956).
3. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §8.
4. People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (:1955); Petition of Provoo,
17 F.R.D. 183 (1955), aff'd on motion, 350 U.S. 857; 6 BUFFALO L. REV. 53 (1956).
5. N.Y. CODE CmRI. PROC. §668.
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mind.6 But the ordinary meaning of the words used, and the grammatical con-
struction should be adhered to unless it is at variance with that legislative intent."
The Court in New York Post Corp. v,. Leibou'itz," by statutory interpretation,
found that mandamus was an appropriate remedy to obtain a copy of the charge
to the jury, on the grounds that the judge had a duty to make them available upon
request. This duty was found by holding that a charge to the jury was a "decision"
within the meaning of the constitutional mandate requiring that judicial opinions
or decisions be free for publication.0 The right of the plaintiff newspaper to the
charge to the jury was found in the Public Officers Law'0 and the Judiciary Law.'
The former requires a person having custody of records or papers in a public
office to make transcripts of them upon request and payment of a fee. The latter
dictates that a court stenographer must write out the minutes of a proceeding if
requested by the judge of the court or by a person legally entitled thereto. The
Court found that the notes of the stenographer were records, and that the stenog-
rapher was a person in public office within the meaning of the Public Officers
Law. From this the Court concluded that anyone upon request and payment of a
fee is entitled to a copy of the stenographer's notes, and that the stenographer,
under the Judiciary Law, is required to write out the notes of the proceeding
requested. The Court felt that any other interpretation of these statutes would
result in a conflict with the constitutional requirement of free publication of
judicial decisions.
There is no doubt that one of the basic freedoms of our society is a public
trail, nor is there any doubt that complete press coverage insures that a trial will
be public."' That a newspaper be entitled, as a matter of right, to a charge to the
jury does not seem to raise any serious objections, but the reasons the Court
advances as a basis for this right are not entirely persuasive. The Court seems to
hinge this right upon the conclusion that a charge to the jury is a "decision" under
the Constitution. The cases they cite hold that a charge to the jury may become the
law of the case if not objected to by either party or if affirmed upon appeal.13
But the law of a case is not necessarily a decision, rather it is usually an instruc-
6. People v. Ryan, 274 N.Y. 149, 8 N.E.2d 313 (1937); River Brand Rice
Mills v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 110 N.E.2d 545 (1953).
7. United States v. Montgomery Ward, 150 F.2d 369 (4th Cir. 1945); Surace
v. Sanna, 248 N.Y. 18, 161 N.E. 315 (1928).
8. 2 N.Y.2d. 677, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1957).
9. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §22, states:
. . . all laws and judicial opinions or decisions shall never-
theless be free for publication by any person.
10. N.Y. PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW §66.
11. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw §301.
12. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Note, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381
(1932).
13. Lenard v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 297 N.Y. 103, 75 N.E.2d 261 (1947);
Buchin v. Long Is. Ry., 286 N.Y. 146, 36 N.E.2d 88 (1941).
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tion, a jury charge, or a ruling made on a former appeal,14 and its effect is limited
to a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction.15 Nor does the law of the case necessarily
involve reaching a conclusion, as does a decision.'0 Even if it is assumed that a
charge to the jury is a decision there is no authority given for the contention that
the Constitution intended to apply to decisions not filed in the office of the clerk
of the court. Therefore it seems questionable whether mandamus should lie on
the grounds that the judge had a duty to make the charge available.
The Court also seems to be reaching too far in calling the stenographers'
notes records in a public office. The statutes provide a means for having the
notes written out and filed with the clerk of the court; 17 until this is done they
can hardly be termed as records.' s Further to say that the stenographers' notes are
records and thereby requiring the stenographer to write them out upon anyone's
request seems to defeat the purpose of section 301 of the Judiciary Law, since that
section requires the court stenographer to write out the notes of a proceeding only
if the judge of the court so directs, or if required to do so by a person entitled
by law to a copy. Section 300 of the Judiciary Law defines persons entitled to a
transcript as being the party, his attorney, the judge, and in criminal cases, the
prosecuting attorney. The interpretation that the Court placed upon these statutes
seems to go beyond their ordinary meaning, and the intent of the legislature.
The "right" given to the plaintiff to obtain a copy of the minutes of a proceeding,
thought not objectionable in itself, lacks adequate definition. Is the "right" only
available to one who seeks it for publication purposes, or is it available to anyone
for any purpose? Is the "right" to be available in cases where the court excludes
the general public for purposes of preserving the public decency? If such a right
is to be created the power to create it lies in the legislature, where it can be
adequately defined and controlled, and not in the courts.' 9
Trial-Righf Of Defendanf To Be Free Of Shackles
Section 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure20 codifies the common law2 '
14. Mann v. Simpson & Co., 286 N.Y. 450, 36 N.E.2d 658 (1941); Douglas v.
Manfree Realty Corp., 263 App. Div. 998, 33 N.Y.S.2d 423 (2d Dep't 1942); Walker
Memorial Baptist Church v. Saunders, 173 Misc. 455, 17 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
15. Walker v. Gerli, 257 App. Div. 249, 12 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1st Dep't 1939).16. Lambros v. Young, 145 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
17. N.Y. JUDIcIARY LAw §13.
18. People v. Clurman, 290 N.Y. 242. 48 N.E.2d 505 (1943); American District
Telegraph Co. v. Woodbury, 127 App. Div. 455, 112 N.Y. Supp. 165 (3d D.ep't
1908); Goldsmith v. Hubbard, 183 Misc. 889, 52 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
19. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918);
Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N.Y. 264, 146 N.E. 374 (1925); Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N.Y.
357 (1876).
20. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §10 provides:
• .. [Nior can a person charged with a crime be subject,
before conviction, to any more restraint than is necessary for
his detention to answer the charge.
21. COAMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, REPORT 10 (1850).
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in directing that a person charged with a crime shall be free from shackles during
his trial except to the extent deemed necessary by the trial court.
In People v. Mendola,22 the Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the
Appellate Division2 3 and held that the trial court had not committed an abuse
of discretion, as a matter of law, in permitting the defendant to be handcuffed
during his trial for a previous escape from prison. Defendant was admittedly des-
perate and had said that he would have escaped even if he "had one day to go."
The Court pointed out that it might have been a better practice for the trial court
to have heard testimony bearing on the necessity of the handcuffs, but held that
in any event the record contained sufficient evidence to justify that court's action
in refusing to order the handcuffs removed.
The case was remanded to the Appellate Division to give them an oppor-
tunity to exercise their discretion under section 527 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure.24 On subsequent determination2a it was held that a new trial was necessary
in the interest of justice. It would seem that much of the procedural difficulty
involved in this type of case could be eliminated if the appellate court, in the first
instance, would, whenever possible, rest its reversal both on the law and on the
ground that it was necessary in the interest of justice, as was done in People v.
Strewl.28
Recantafion
Recantation, as applied within the scope of the law of perjury, is the renun-
ciation or withdrawal of a prior statement made before a tribunal.27 It has been
recognized for centuries as a defense to the crime of perjury.28
People v. Ezaugi," sets forth the criterion which the defendant must meet
to apply this defense. The defendant in the instant case had intentionally testified
falsely before a grand jury. After having left the witness stand, he discovered
that the truth regarding his testimony was, and had been known all during the
proceeding to the officials conducting the grand jury hearing. The defendant
22. 2 N.Y.2d 270, 159 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1957).
23. 1 A.D.2d 413, 151 N.Y.S.2d 278 (4th Dep't 1956).
24. N.Y. CODE CRM. PROC. §527 provides:
... And the appellate court may order a new trial if it be
satisfied that .. . justice requires a new trial ....
25. 3 A.D.2d 811, 160 N.Y.S.2d 232 (4th Dep't 1957).
26. 246 App. Div. 400, 287 N.Y. Supp. 585 (3rd Dep't 1936), appeal dismissed
271 N.Y. 607, 3 N.E.2d 207 (1936).
27. Llanos-Senarillos v. United States, 177 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1949).
28. King v. Jones, 1 Peake's Rep. 51 (N.P. 1791); King v. Carr, 1 Sid. 418
(K. B. 1669).
29. 2 N.Y.2d 439, 161 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1957).
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reappeared before the grand jury on the next day, repudiated his previous testi-
mony, and related the events as they actually transpired.
The Court of Appeals, uponweighing all the facts in this case, concluded
that such a recantation was but a calculated effort to escape the consequences of
perjury prosecution, and refused to apply the recantation doctrine to cover this
type of situation. The Court established the criterion that a recantation to be an
effective defense against perjury, must be prompt, committed before harm is done
to the inquiry, and before the recanter has reason to believe the truth has been
discovered. The defendant failed to meet the last requirement, and the majority
of the Court affirmed his conviction.
The dissent stated that a grand jury investigation, has for its sole purpose,
the discovery of the truth, and every inducement should be made to the witness to
aid in its elicitation.3o The inducement would be destroyed if a witness could not
correct a false statement except by running the risk of a perjury prosecution.
This decision does not, as the dissenters hold, almost eliminate the practical
usage of the recantation rule. The defendant, by his actions, made unavailable the
recantation defense. His recanting was not prompt, and although obviously lying,
he refused to change his testimony during this initial appearance on the witness
stand, while given every opportunity to do so. In People v. Gillette,31 upon which
the dissent strongly relies, the alleged incorrect statements were immediately
corrected in the succeeding interrogation. This defense has also been upheld when
then erroneous statements were made on direct examination and corrected on
cross examination.32 The majority in affirmance has sensibly refused to stretch
the recantation defense to cover a defendant in cases where he waits too long in
presenting his recantation to the court.
Senfence-Mulfiple Punishment
In view of N.Y. Penal Law section 1938,33 it has frequently been held that
a court may not impose consecutive sentences where the same act is the basis
for convictions obtained on a multiple count indictment.34 However, in People
30. People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133 (1st Dep't 1908).
31. Note 30 supra.
32. People v. Brill, 100 Misc. 92, 165 N.Y. Supp. 65 (Sup. Ct. 1917); People
v. Glass, 191 App. Div. 483, 181 N.Y. Supp. 547 (2d Dep't 1920).
33. N.Y. PENAL LAW §1938 provides:
An act or omission which is made criminal and punishable
in different ways, by different provisions of law, may be
punished under any one of these provisions, but not under
more than one; and a conviction or acquital under any one
bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any
other provision.
34. People v. Repola, 280 App. Div. 735, 117 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1st Dep't 1952),
aff'd without opiniou 305 N.Y. 740, 113 N.E.2d 42 (1953).
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ex rel. Mauer v. Jackson,35 where the defendant pleaded guilty to the offenses
of attempted robbery in the first degree and assault in the first degree, the Court
of Appeals held that concurrent sentences could be imposed.
The Court rested their decision on dual grounds. It was first held that
robbery, and assault with the intent to kill are separate acts which may command
separate punishments, thus rendering section 1938 inapplicable. Here it was
pointed out that although a simple assault merges with the act of robbery,3 0 an
assault with the intent to kill is a separate and distinct act since such an intent
is not a necessary element of the crime of robbery.37
Secondly, and most notably, the Court held that concurrent sentences do
not impose a double punishment on the defendant.3 s The Court felt that such
sentences merge into a single punishment measured by the sentence for the
highest grade offense. It was pointed out that section 1938 condemns only
multiple punishment and is silent as to multiple convictions and concurrent
sentences.
Defendant contended that concurrent sentences effected a double punishment
since his chances for parole would be injured.39 The Court rejected this, saying
that even without concurrent sentences the record of multiple convictions would
appear on defendant's record.
The practical effect of the above decision is to restrict the operation of
section 1938 to cases involving 'consecutive rather than concurrent sentences.
It is also noteworthy that this interpretation helps to insure against the defendant
going unpunished if an error is found in the conviction for the highest degree
crime.
Appeal And Error
Section 542 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states, "After hearing the
appeal, the court must give judgment, without regard to technical errors or
defects or to exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
35. 2 N.Y.2d 259, 159 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1957).
36. Zovick v. Eaton, 259 App. Div. 585, 20 N.Y.S.2d 477 (3rd Dep't 1940);
Richardson v. Morhaus, 182 Misc. 299, 43 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
37. N.Y. PENAL LAW §2124 provides:
Robbery in first degree. An unlawful taking or compulsion,
if accomplished by force or. . . when committed by a person:
1. Being armed with a dangerous weapon ....
38. This is an apparent reversal of the Court's former position In affirming
lower court cases holding contra: People v. Nelson, 309 N.Y. 231, 128 N.E.2d
391 (1955); People v. Goggin, 281 N.Y. 611, 22 N.E.2d 174 (1939).
39. This argument has been accepted in other jurisdictions. People v. Craig,
17 Cal.2d 453, 110 P.2d 403 (1941).
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Under this section the question of substantial rights is not the abstract question
of guilt or innocence; a guilty man being in any event entitled to a fair trial. 40
Error affects substantial rights when it can be said that it tended ;o influence
the verdict.41
In the cases of People v. Ochs42 and People v. Mende, 43 the Court reversed
convictions and ordered new trials on the grounds that in each case the substantial
rights of the defendants had been affected. In both cases the Court felt that
although the evidence was sufficient to find the defendants guilty, they had been
deprived of a fair trial. In the former case the Court held that it was improper
for the trial judge to include in the charge to the jury his opinion on the credibility
of the defendant as an interested witness. In the latter case the Court held that
it was improper for the trial judge to question defendant's witnesses in such a
manner as to indicate a communicable disbelief of their testimony.
In the case of People v. LaMarca,4 4 the Court affirmed a conviction on the
grounds that the errors alleged were technical and not reversible errors. The
Court held that although it may be error for a trial judge to fail to answer a
question propounded by the jury,45 after a full and proper charge has been given,
that error will not be reversible unless there is a serious prejudice to the
defendant's rights in the failure or refusal to answer the question. The Court
also held that it was not error for the trial judge to fail to charge as to lesser
degrees of homicide, since such a charge need not be given in a felony murder
prosecution unless called for by the evidence.
The purpose of section 542 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to do
away with reversals upon technical errors which really had not affected the
result,40 or infringed upon the fundamental right to a fair and impartial trial.47
Not only error, but harm to the defendant, must be shown to justify the reversal
of a judgment of conviction.4" Where the trial judge makes direct comments
which are unfair and prejudicial to the defendant, the defendant is dearly not
given a fair trial 40 Whether a defendant is deprived of a fair trial because of
40. People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N.Y. 411, 139 N.E. 558 (1923).
41. People v. Gerdvine, 210 N.Y. 184, 104 N.E. 129 (1914).
42. 3 N.Y.2d 54, 163 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1957).
43. 3 N.Y.2d 120, 164 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1957).
44. 3 N.Y.2d 452, 165 N.YS.2d 753 (1957).
45. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §427; People v. Gonzales, 293 N.Y. 259, 56 N.E.2d
574 (1944).
46. People v. Cummins, 209 N.Y. 283, 103 N.E. 169 (1913); People v. Bailey,
215 N.Y. 711, 109 N.E. 1086 (1915).
47. People v. Becker, 210 N.Y. 274, 104 N.E. 396 (1914); People v. De
Martino, 252 App. Div. 476, 299 N.Y.Supp. 781 (2d Dep't 1938).
48. People v. Youns, 151 N.Y. 210, 45 N.E. 460 (1896); People v. Patrick,
182 N.Y. 131, 74 N.E. 843 (1905).
49. People v. Corey, 157 N.Y. 332, 51 N.E. 1024 (1898); People v. Scaringi,
241 App. Div. 883, 271 N.Y. Supp. 1079 (2d Dep't 1934).
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questions asked by a trial court is a closer issue, as indicated by the dissent in
People v. Meandes. It is often a necessary and proper function of a trial judge
to take part in the examination of a witness to elicit significant facts, to clarify
issues or to facilitate the orderly progress of the trial5 0 But the trial judge must
refrain from asking questions in such a way as to disclose his opinion on the
merits or indicating a doubt on his part as to credibility of witnessess.5 ' Under
section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a trial judge may not decline to
answer jury's request for further instructions, but not every failure to answer
jury's questions constitutes reversible error.5 2 It is only where the court fails to
give information requested on a vital point, or where the failure to answer does




The writ of error coram nobis will be granted upon a showing that a convic-
tion was obtained by coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, or in any situation where
the defendant has been convicted without a preservation of his constitutional
rights, and this does not appear on the record.54 It is also a proper remedy to void
a conviction where it is established that the defendant had been mentally incom-
petent at the time of his arraignment.55 In People v. Sullivan,56 People v.
Smyth,5 7 People v. Silvermant8 and People v. Shapiro,5 the Court of Appeals
added both clarity and confusion to the problems surrounding the ancient writ.
In People v. Sullivan,60 defendant contended that the failure of the trial clerk
to ask him, after his plea of guilty, whether he had legal cause to show why judg-
ment should not be rendered, was such a denal of due process as to permit use
of the writ of error coram nobis.6' The Court denied this claim, and declared that
50. People v. Ohanian, 245 N.Y. 227, 157 N.E. 94 (1927.)
51. People v. Mulvey, 1 A.D.2d 541, 151 N.Y.S.2d 587 (4th Dep't 1956);
People v. Pecoraro, 177 App. Div. 803, 164 N.Y. Supp. 1058 (2d Dep't 1917); People
v. Kachadourian, 116 N.Y.S.2d 486 (County Ct. 1952).
52. People v. Gezzo, 307 N.Y. 385, 121 N.E.2d 380 (1954); People v. Lay, 279
N.Y. 737, 18 N.E.2d 686 (1938).
53. People v. Gonzales, 293 N.Y. 259, 56 N.E.2d 574 (1944); People v.
Shapiro, 285 N.Y. 581. 33 N.E.2d 250 (1941); People v. Wilkie, 286 App. Div. 835,
142 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1st Dep't 1955).
54. People v. Sadness, 300 N.Y. 69, 89 N.E.2d 188 (1949). See I BUFFALO L.
REV. 272 (1952) for a good discussion of the history of the writ of coram nobis
in New York.
55. People v. Boehm, 309 N.Y. 362, 368, 130 N.E.2d 897, 900 (1955).
56. 3 N.Y.2d 196, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1957).
57. 3 N.Y.2d 184, 165 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1957).
58. 3 N.Y.2d 200, 165 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1957).
59. 3 N.Y.2d 203, 165 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1957).
60. See note 56, supra.
61. Defendant relied upon section 480 of the CODE OF CVIMINAL PROCzDUnE
which declares:
When the defendant appears for judgment, he must be
asked by the clerk whether he has any legal cause to show
why judgment should not be pronounced.
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where only "the validity of the sentence is in question, the defendant is limited" -
to other forms of appeal. In reaching its result, it stated that, before entertaining
a motion for a writ, it was first necessary to determine the nature of the under-
lying error, such as conviction through coercion, or fraud.63 Second, and more
important, it viewed the writ itself as an emergency measure, a tool of the court
used in the exercise of discretion, when all other avenues of judicial relief were
closed to a defendant. To be successful, the defendant must satisfy the two criteria
formulated by the Court. Since the defendant in People v. Smyth"4 could not pro-
duce evidence of his mental incompetence at the time of arraignment, he could
not demand a writ by demonstrating that the nature of the error allowed for the
use of the writ.
Both of these standards were applied in People v. Shapiro,63 where the Court
affirmed an order denying a motion to vacate judgment through an. attempted use
of the writ, since errors of fact were apparent on the face of the record, and
another means of appeal was available, although not taken by counsel.6  The
result in the People v. Silverman case was not so satisfying. There the contention
of the defendant that the trial court improperly assigned counsel to him, and
refused to grant counsel of his own choosing, was held to be error of such a nature
as to entitle him to a hearing on his motion.6 Although the Court examined the
nature of the underlying error, and found for the defendant, it did not satisfy the
other criterion set forth in the Sullivan case; that it, the unavailability of any
other avenue of judicial relief by way of appeal, since the Court found the error to
be obvious and a regular appeal would lie.6 s Because a post-conviction remedy
was available, the writ should have been denied, even though the nature of the
error allowed for a use of the writ of error coram nobis.
If the Court in the Sullivan decision meant that a defendant need only meet
one of the criteria set forth, then the decisions are consistent. But, there was great
emphasis placed upon the extraordinary quality, the emergency use, of coram
nobis, and the need to meet that criterion along with the other relating to the
nature of the mistake. Even a desire to treat each case according to its own equities
can not satisfactorily explain the misapplication or non-application of the two
standards established in the Sullivan case. A contrary result in the case of People
v. Silverman would have established much sounder footing for future case problems
62. People v. Sullivan, 3 N.Y.2d 196, 198, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6, 9 (1957).
63. Id. at 198, 165 N.Y.S.2 at 9. For a discussion of the types of cases where
relief has been afforded, and which provide the basis for the narrow use of the
writ, see 1 BUFFALO L. REV. 274 (1952), and cases cited therein.
64. 3 N.Y.2d at 186, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
65. See note 59 supra.
66. People v. Shapiro, 3 N.Y.2d 203, 204, 165 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (1957).
67. People v. Silverman, 3 N.Y.2d 200, 165 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1957).
68. Id. at 201, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
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involving coram nobis where both the nature of the writ and its emergency appli-
cation are brought into dispute.
Parole Violation
The Correction Law, section 219, provides that if any prisoner, who has
been paroled from a state prison commits and is convicted of a crime in another
state, which if committed in this state would be a felony, he shall upon his
return to this state be confined in prison to serve the remaining portion of the
maximum sentence from which he had been paroled.69 The Court held (4-3) in
People ex rel. Watkins v. Murphy,7 0 a habeas corpus proceeding, that section 218
of the Correction Law,71 which provides that a parole board should declare a
prisoner to be delinquent whenever there is reasonable cause to believe he has
violated his parole, does not terminate the prisoner's parole so as to immunize him
from the penalty imposed by section 219.
The defendant, a parolee from a New York prison, had been declared
delinquent from such parole in accordance with section 218. A month later he
was arrested, convicted and sentenced to a term in a Texas prison for the
commission of a crime, which all of the Court agreed would be a felony if
committed in this state. Upon being released from the Texas prison, he was
returned to New York to serve the remainder of the maximum sentence from
which he had originally been paroled.
When a prisoner is paroled, he is in fact being permitted to serve part of
his sentence outside of prison.7 2 As of the time he is declared delinquent from
this parole however, his sentence stops and the "time owed shall date from such
delinquency."7 3
The dissenting judges upheld the defendant's contention that he did not
commit the crime while he was on parole for he had previously been declared
delinquent thereby terminating his parole. As soon as the parole is declared
delinquent, he assumes the status of an escaped convict.74 Therefore, since he
is no longer lawfully out of prison, he cannot be said to be a charge of the Board
of Parole;75 nor can he be said to be on parole within the meaning of section 219
if he is no longer on parole within the meaning of section 218.
The majority however views the parolee as a prisoner on parole and until
69. N.Y. COEMcTON LAw §219.
70. 3 N.Y.2d 163, 164 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1957).
71. N.Y. CORPEcTioN LAW §218.
72. People ex rel. Rainone v. Murphy, 1 N.Y.2d 367, 153 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1956).
73. N.Y. CORRECTION LAW §218.
74. Hutchings v. Mallon, 245 N.Y. 521, 157 N.E. 842 (1927).
75. Dote v. Martin, 294 N.Y. 330, 62 N.E.2d 217 (1945).
